Listen to the Israeli general's analysis. According to Tasnim News Agency, Report No. 225 of the Tasnim News Agency's War Commentary Group on the 38th day of the war discussed the reasons for the strategic failure of the Israeli army in the recent war:

A new analysis by Israeli General Isaac Barik has been published on the current situation in Israel, tracing its roots to a gradual process spanning almost three decades. He believes that this path began after the Yom Kippur War, but has intensified significantly in the last three decades and has ultimately led to the current situation.

The decline of the strategic approach

Barik believes that the Israeli army has been reduced from a "strategic-oriented army" to a "crisis manager" as a result of the policies adopted. According to him, this army no longer has a grand strategic vision and acts only in a reactive manner; That is, instead of planning and conducting war on a regional and global scale, it only responds to the epicenters of crisis—like a firefighter who goes from incident to incident without a comprehensive plan. 

Replacing the classical structure with a technology-based air force

The analysis emphasizes that about two-thirds of the traditional capacity of the Israeli army has been weakened, and instead, the main focus has been on developing a technology-based air force. This shift, according to Brick, although it has created advantages, has also weakened the strategic foundations of the army and transformed it from a comprehensive force into a one-dimensional tool. 

Consequences: Erosion of the home front

One of the most important consequences of this process is the sharp decrease in the resilience of Israel’s “home front.” Brik distinguishes between different fronts:

The classic fronts (such as the north against Hezbollah or the south against Gaza) and a new front called the “back of the front” or the internal space of society

According to him, in previous conflicts - even in recent crises - the level of conflict within Israeli society was limited:

In the events of October 7, the internal conflict was largely confined to the first day or two and the areas around Gaza.

In the conflict with Hezbollah, the conflict was also largely confined to the northern border strip (about 10 kilometers).

The difference in the current war

However, in the current situation, according to Brik, for the first time, the “back of the front” has been continuously and extensively involved. He emphasizes that:

For 37 consecutive days, the internal front has been involved, the conflict has included casualties, disruptions and insecurity in the cities, and this has significantly reduced social resilience and the ability to continue the war.